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Abstract
In this paper, we employ archival materials from multiple institutional sources to reconstruct
the dynamic network of interorganizational collaboration that emerged in response to the Hurri-
cane Katrina disaster of late 2005. Over the period from initial storm formation through the first
week following landfall in Louisiana, we record active participation by over 1,500 organizations
in response activities. We here conduct an exploratory analysis of the growth and evolution of
the network of collaboration among responding organizations, an identification of organizations
that emerged as central actors in the response process, and the cohesive subgroups that crystal-
lized within the larger network. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of several issues related
to the use of archival methods in research on interorganizational networks in disaster settings,
and to the use of automated methods for network extraction.
Keywords: disasters, Hurricane Katrina, emergent multiorganizational networks, interorganiza-
tional collaboration
1 Introduction
When the impact of a natural or anthropogenic hazard (such as an earthquake, hurricane, or flood)
exceeds the short-term capacity of human systems to respond, the result is a disaster. Disasters
thus produce a “breaching” of the conventional patterns of social organization, leading to new (and
sometimes long-lasting) social structures. In the modern context, one facet of this reorganization
is the mobilization (and, in some cases, formation ex nihilo) of organizations to respond to the
adverse event. In the aftermath of the initial impact, large numbers of organizations may converge
upon the affected area, joined eventually by new organizations that are synthesized to solve particu-
lar problems or exploit particular assets arising during the response process (Fritz and Mathewson,
1957; Drabek and McEntire, 2002). Although some such entities will act more or less autonomously,
many will collaborate in order to pool resources, resolve task interdependencies, or leverage comple-
mentary capabilities. The result of these interactions is an emergent multiorganizational network
(or “EMON”), the evolving structure of realized relations among responding organizations.
∗This research was supported in part by NSF awards CHE-0555125 and CMS-0624257, and by ONR award
N00014-08-1-1015. The authors would like to thank Noshir Contractor, Kathleen Tierney, and Christine Bevc for
their suggestions and input.
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Although mass convergence of organizations in response to disaster is known to be ubiquitous
in the developed world (see, e.g. Fritz and Mathewson, 1957; Mileti et al., 1975; Auf der Heide,
1989; Drabek and McEntire, 2002; Drabek, 2003), there are relatively few studies that examine
the networks formed by these organizations in quantitative detail. Drabek et al. (1981) conducted
an early comparative study of communication-based EMONs from remote area search and rescue
operations, most of which arose from relatively small-scale events. Work by Topper and Carley
(1999) examined collaboration among organizations in the Exxon Valdez disaster, with a particular
focus on the dynamics of centrality over the course of the response. More recent work by Tierney
(2003); Tierney and Trainor (2004); Comfort and Kapucu (2006) and Kapucu (2006) has examined
the large collection of organizations responding to the World Trade Center disaster, an event that
prompted substantial organizational interaction on a number of fronts; local newspaper coverage of
organizational interactions during the Hurricane Katrina disaster has also been studied by Comfort
and Haas (2006), with Lind et al. (2008) examining communication networks within two impacted
communities. Although these studies vary considerably in coverage and methodology, all reinforce
the basic intuitions that response networks involve a wide range of organizational actors (varying
in scale, mission, and type); responding organizations differ considerably in the nature and extent
of their interaction with others; and response networks show substantial change over time. Drabek
et al. (1981) further note the relationship of structural position to influence in decision making
processes, an argument that echoes a common theme within the social network literature (Gould
and Fernandez, 1989; van Merode et al., 2004). Even in the absence of a formal command structure,
however, collaborative relationships between responding organizations can act as critical conduits
for information, resources, and logistical support (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek and McEntire, 2002;
Wachtendorf, 2004).
This phenomenon of interorganizational collaboration is of particular importance for an event
such as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster, in which massive damage on a large spatial scale
required a highly distributed response. A brief review of the storm’s history (based on Knabb
et al. (2005)) makes clear the extent of the challenges involved. Katrina formed from Tropical
Depression 12 on 8/23/051 off the southeastern coast of Florida (near the Bahamas). It obtained
hurricane status on 8/24/05, making its initial landfall in Florida on 8/25/05. The storm was
relatively weak during this period, and damage was thus fairly limited. After crossing southern
Florida, Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico. There, it gained considerable strength, becoming a
category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale by 8/28/05. Although the storm subsequently
weakened, it was still a category 3 storm (with sustained winds of over 205kph, and hurricane
winds over a 190km radius) when it made secondary landfall near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana on
the morning of 8/29/05 (refer to Figure 1 based on NOAA (2006)). In addition to high winds,
driving rain and a massive storm surge (over 8m in some locales) caused extensive flooding over
large areas of coastal Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and northwestern Florida. Damage in many
areas was severe. Estimates of fatalities range from 1,319 (Bourque et al., 2006) to 1,833 (Knabb
et al., 2005) persons, with approximately 2,500 persons reported missing (Bourque et al., 2006) and
over 270,000 evacuees displaced (Gabe et al., 2006); the direct financial cost of the storm has been
estimated at over $80 billion (Knabb et al., 2005). Consonant with this grim picture, transportation
and telecommunications infrastructures were severely degraded over much of the impacted region.
Communities such as St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana were without telephone service for several
weeks, and were without wireless telephony for several days (Banipal, 2006; Comfort and Haas,
2006). Such losses made an already complex response effort more difficult by reducing the ability
of organizations to deploy to and operate within the affected area (Independent Panel Reviewing
1For brevity, all dates are given in month/day/year format.
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Figure 1: The Path and Strength of Hurricane Katrina, by Date
the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 2006). Despite these challenges, a
large number of organizations from around the United States (and, in some cases, other countries)
mobilized in response to the disaster. In the days following landfall, these organizations began
undertaking relief efforts both individually and in collaboration with one another. The network
of ties that developed between responding organizations serves as an important example of the
formation of social structure in a substantially disrupted setting; by reconstructing this network,
we thereby avail ourselves of a valuable opportunity to examine the structural context in which the
initial stages of response to a large-scale disaster take place.
In this paper, then, we examine the dynamic network of interorganizational collaboration that
emerged in response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina. Our study relies on archival materials
collected from a number of institutional sources, which detail organizations’ internal accounts of
their and others’ interactions. We begin our presentation with a discussion of these materials, as
well as a brief description of our data coding methods. From this, we proceed to an overview of the
data, as well as an exploratory analysis of the EMON’s evolution, an identification of organizations
that emerged as central actors in the response, and an investigation of the cohesive subgroups of
collaborating organizations that formed within the broader network. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion of several issues related to the use of archival methods in research on disaster-generated
EMONs, and the use of automated methods for network extraction. The data set employed in this
study is included as an appendix to this paper.
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2 Data Collection and Coding
A major challenge in the study of interorganizational network formation during disaster is the
identification of participating organizations (and ties among them) within a substantially disrupted
setting. While direct observation of organizational behavior in the impacted area is rarely feasible
on a large scale (particularly in the initial phases of an event), organizational activities leave durable
traces that can be used to reconstruct the history of an event. In our case, these“traces”are archival
materials produced by organizations involved in the response process, which describe activities
taken by various actors (including but not limited to the issuing organizations) in the aftermath of
the storm. As we shall describe, the particular materials used here were documents produced to
help coordinate task performance by organizational members and affiliates involved in the response
effort, and belong to a fairly standard genre of such documents. By using such task-centered,
“backstage” materials (in the sense of Goffman (1959)), we avoid many of the potential biases
associated with materials produced for outside entities. In this section, we describe the process of
material collection and processing for this study, as well as the coding methods employed to extract
network information from the source materials; further details. Some additional issues related to
the use of these materials in disaster research are also discussed in Section 4.
2.1 Materials Collection and Document Processing
The source materials for this data set are drawn from a larger corpus of online documents manually
collected by the authors during the period from 9/3/05 through 11/28/05. All information is derived
from public sources. Here, we provide an overview of the general process of materials collection for
this project, followed by a discussion of document processing and selection. Due to the dearth of
“standard” procedures for the collection and processing of interorganizational network data from
online documents, we describe our process in greater detail than might be typical for an article
using more conventional data collection methods.2 It is hoped that this will serve to facilitate
replication, extension, and improvement of this methodology by others in the field.
2.1.1 Collection
The authors collected materials for this project by searching online sources for documents related
to the Hurricane Katrina response. Sources were identified by multiple methods, including: use
of commercial search engines (e.g., Google); direct browsing of state, local, and federal web sites
(as well as sites of other organizations identified as potential responders); references to web sites
in online discussion groups, mailing lists, or web-based information portals; and suggestions from
practitioners in the emergency management community. Where possible, a census of potential
sources (e.g., all state-level emergency management web sites) was employed. This process was
continued throughout the data collection period, as many potential information sources did not
become mobilized until some days following the initial impact; as explained below, the date of
source acquisition did not generally affect the data that was obtainable from that source. In this
paper we henceforth refer to those organizations from which these materials were obtained as“source
organizations.”
Data collection was performed by a manual inspection of and information retrieval from all
source web sites. This process was conducted daily from 9/3/05 through 11/1/05, with one ad-
ditional round of collection on 11/28/05. (Note that most documented response activities closed
down before or shortly after 11/1/05, making this a fairly natural termination point.) With very
2Additional details are provided in the data set documentation; see appendix.
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Type Count
City Governments 5
County Governments 20
State Agencies 4
State Governments 13
Federal Entities 16
Other Organizations 5
Total 63
Table 1: Breakdown of Source Organizations by Type
few exceptions, information on response activities was posted on organizational web sites in a cu-
mulative fashion; thus, most documents posted prior to the onset of data collection on 9/3/05 were
still available on that day, and were captured by the collection process. Collection of documents
was conducted approximately every 24 hours during the “daily” period, usually around midnight
Pacific time. Given the static nature of the data (and in contrast with highly dynamic sources,
such as weblogs (see, e.g. Butts and Cross, 2009)), collection for these materials was not sensitive
to exact timing.
Materials collected consisted of situation reports, press releases, maps, advisories, and other
substantive material posted to the web site of each source. Attempts were made to gather any
informational material pertaining either to Katrina, or to any subsequent disaster to which the
source was responding (e.g., Hurricane Rita). In some cases, materials were missing due to non-
posting by the original source, or problems with the source web site (e.g., malformed URLs that
could not be manually corrected). All accessible materials, however, were collected.
A tabulation of source organizations by type is shown in Table 1. There are 63 source organiza-
tions, headquartered in 14 states (including the District of Columbia). In Table 1, we distinguish
between state governments and state agencies. State emergency management/homeland security
offices and/or governor’s offices are considered to represent the state government per se, with “state
agencies” consisting of other subordinate state-level entities not included in the former. Only the
state of Arkansas was covered by a subordinate state-agency and not the state government sui
generis. All told, the number of documents collected from the 63 source organizations is approxi-
mately 4,500.
It should be noted that an important advantage of the manual approach to data collection
utilized here (as opposed to automated information retrieval, e.g., via “spiders” (Kobayashi and
Takeda, 2000)) is its robustness to site design changes and human error on the part of the source
organizations. We found that web sites were frequently reorganized during the collection period,
with informational postings changing in location and occasionally in form. Similarly, file names
and URLs were occasionally misspelled, misdated, or otherwise malformed, requiring manual cor-
rection to ensure correct retrieval. Although easily resolved by experienced human users, such
inconsistencies made automated information retrieval impractical in this setting; this issue (which
has implications for future research of this kind) will be revisited in Section 4.3.
2.1.2 Document Processing and Selection
For purposes of the current study, a smaller set of documents has been extracted from the larger
corpus. Our objective in employing this subset is to restrict attention to a more manageable set of
documents that cover organizational interaction during the initial phase of the Hurricane Katrina
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response. From the full corpus, we thus restrict attention to materials covering events in the
period from 8/23/05 through 9/5/05; this interval begins with the first mobilization in response to
Katrina’s imminent landfall in Florida, and extends through the first seven days following landfall
in Louisiana. In examining the materials within this set, we found that the vast majority of readily
usable information was contained with a particular genre of documents known as situation reports
(or “SITREPs”). SITREPs are extensively employed by responding organizations as a mechanism
for rapidly summarizing ambient environmental conditions, ongoing hazards, losses incurred, and
tasks being performed both by the issuing organization and by other organizations involved in the
response process. These documents are issued on a periodic basis, and conventionally specify the
time period for which the conditions indicated in the report apply—this makes them particularly
useful when reconstructing the history of the Katrina response. Although typically prepared for
internal use, SITREPs are frequently disseminated to other interested parties (including members
of the public) who may be concerned with response activities and/or conditions in the immediate
area. SITREPs are nearly always prepared in accordance with an internal format or template,
and as such the SITREPs issued by a given entity tend to be constant in form; as organizations
within the emergency management community use very similar standards for SITREP preparation,
documents issued by different entities are also comparable in form and content. Because of their
comparability, ubiquity, consistency, and well-defined temporal coverage, our current study focuses
on these materials. Restricting the set of documents to SITREPs (or equivalent materials) with
coverage in the selected time interval yields a subset of 187 documents; this set is employed for the
analyses that follow.
Once the finalized set of documents was established, various metadata for the documents were
accumulated and recorded. For each of the 187 documents, where available, we extracted the source
organization that created the document, the publication date of the document, and the start and
end dates of coverage.
2.2 Organizational Coding
The first step in the network extraction process is the identification of organizations referred to
within the source materials. For this study, an “organization” is defined to be any named en-
tity that represents (directly or indirectly) multiple persons or other entities, and that acts as
a de facto decision making unit within the context of the response. This includes conventional
organizational units such as non-profit corporations, firms, government agencies, teams, and repre-
sentatives/liaisons of such organizations, as well as emergent collectives such as emergency support
function (ESF) groups and organized volunteer coalitions. It should be emphasized here that the
distinguishing feature of an organizational actor for this study was its capacity to act as a decision
maker. Thus, entities such as locations (e.g., airfields) would not considered eligible for inclu-
sion if they were merely passive sites for the action of others (e.g., simply a location for aircraft
takeoffs/landings). On the other hand, an organization associated with such an entity with the
capacity to act as a decision making unit (e.g., an airport management authority) would be consid-
ered eligible for inclusion in this data set. By the same token, sub-organizations acting as de facto
decision making units in the field would be considered eligible for independent inclusion, regardless
of whether or not their “parent” organizations were also present. This reflects the phenomenal na-
ture of the response environment, in which multiple elements of a large-scale organization (e.g., the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)) frequently serve as semi-autonomous sources
of action. Although this phenomenon is especially prevalent in disasters, it is not unique to this
context; for instance, similar properties have been ascribed to “network forms” of organizations in
entrepreneurial contexts such as the information and biotechnology industries (Powell, 1990; Powell
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et al., 1996).
To improve the speed and accuracy of organizational identification, a two-stage process was used.
In the first pass, a coder identified apparent textual references to eligible organizations (per the
above definition); these references were tagged for subsequent examination. After this process was
complete, a second pass was performed to code the tagged references (i.e., to associate the tagged
text with a standardized organization name). Finally, standardized names were cross-checked to
ensure consistency and correctness. In all, 1,577 eligible organizations were identified as having
been present within the processed source materials.
2.3 Relational Coding
After the identification of organizational references, the next step in the network extraction process
is the identification of collaborative relationships among organizations. For purposes of this project,
two organizations are said to collaborate if they engage in any substantive interaction—e.g., infor-
mation transfer, exchange of manpower, donations of material or financial support, or delegation
of authority—related to task performance. As the directionality of such interactions was not uni-
formly apparent from the documentary evidence (and, in any event, would not be well-defined for
all types of interaction), collaboration was coded as an undirected relation. Likewise, the documen-
tary evidence did not always specify the full details of the collaborative relationship; for this reason,
no distinction was made among different types of possible collaboration. Thus, collaboration for
the present study is (by construction) a dyadic, mutual, and dichotomous relationship on the set
of eligible organizations.
The process by which relationships were identified was similar to that employed for identifying
organizations. As before, a two-pass procedure was used. In the first pass, a coder tagged all
apparent references to relational activity between organizations within the source text. That is, all
portions of text that indicated relational information between actors were flagged. In the second
pass, these relational activity tags were inspected. All explicit mentions of relations between orga-
nizations referred to in the tagged text were extracted and aggregated into a master sociomatrix of
organizations.
2.4 Acquisition of Secondary Data
In addition to the primary data on organizational interaction provided by the source materials,
secondary information on organizational attributes was collected from other sources. The variables
coded for each organization include: type (government, non-profit, for-profit, or collective), scale
(ranging from local to international), parent organizations (if any), city and state location of the
organization’s permanent headquarters (if applicable), and whether or not the organization was
also a data source. The latter was self-evident from our SITREPs. The authors collected all other
secondary data from information found on organizational websites. When a website could not be
found, information about the organization’s city and state location was obtained by querying Inter-
net search engines with the organization name and any other identifying information available in
the SITREPs (the name of an organizational representative, for example). The specific procedures
for collecting secondary data on organization type, scale, and parent hierarchy is described below.
2.4.1 Coding for Organizational “Lineage”
As noted above, de facto organizational actors within the Katrina response were often formally
instantiated as sub-units of other, larger organizations. Such subordinate units are said to be
“child” organizations, with the superordinate unit being referred to as the organization’s “parent.”
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To facilitate reconstruction of the hierarchy in which particular actors were embedded, parental
relationships were coded for all organizations in the Katrina EMON. In some cases, parent organi-
zations were entities that appeared elsewhere in the data set (e.g. the U.S. Department of Defense
is an organization found in the EMON but also is a parent of the United States Navy). In other
cases, however, parent organizations were not themselves direct actors in the response (e.g. Choice
Hotels, Inc., parent of Comfort Inn, Memphis, TN); lineage was traced in the same manner, regard-
less of EMON participation. Once all parent organizations for the 1,577 responding organizations
were identified, this process was repeated on the parent set. Such iteration was continued until no
new parent organizations could be identified; in some cases, this resulted in a chain of as many
as five elements. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Deployable Tactical Operations
Center is a child of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (first order), which is a child of the U.S.
Army (second order), which is a child of the U.S. Department of Defense (third order), which is a
child of the U.S. Federal Government (fourth order). While such long chains were possible, not all
organizations were identified to have parents. (Emergent organizations in the sense of Dynes (1970),
for instance, do not have such relationships.) This structure of containment is a potentially useful
adjunct to the information on organizational collaboration derived from the source documents. In
particular, such information allows for flexible aggregation of low-level interactions when necessary,
without imposing this constraint at the level of data collection.
To obtain this organizational lineage, information was first sought from child organization web-
sites; relationships obtained in this way were then verified by inspection of the alleged parent
organizations’ websites. This approach yielded reliable results in all but a few cases, for which the
protocol was reversed (i.e., suspected parents were searched to identify references to child organiza-
tions). In the case of for-profit entities, some child organizations’ websites did not clearly indicate
their parents. When this occurred, the organization name was queried through Internet search
engines and a potential parent organization website was identified. Company prospectus sheets
and other legal documents, usually available electronically, were used to verify child organizations
by name and city and/or state location. In the case of Kerr-McGee Chemical LLC., for instance,
the information that its parent was Anadarko Petroleum Corporation was determined through
secondary source legal proceedings of the EPA vs. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation because the
child company did not have an active website or listed phone number. All lineage information
included within the Katrina data set reflect the organizations’ respective relationships during the
study period.
2.4.2 Scale/Type Coding
Two coders made several independent passes through the extracted data to acquire organizational
type and scale of operations information for each organization in the Katrina EMON. The protocol
for coding this data was based on the Tierney (2003) type and scale definitions for their 9/11 World
Trade Center EMON study. Organizational scale—the size of the primary jurisdiction and/or
region of operations for a given organization—was ascertained by examining organization names
for cues about their area of focus and verifying the cues by examining supplemental information
on organization websites, government documents, and SITREPs. The categories of organization
scale are: local (15.7%), city (5.7%), county (10%), state (38%), interstate (1.3%), regional (2.9%),
national (17.1%), and international (8.3%). Organizations with indeterminate scale were coded as
missing on this dimension (missing N = 17, or 1.1% of the EMON). Where ambiguous, various
Internet services such as organization websites, Google, and Wikipedia were referenced to acquire
such information.
Organization type—the general terms under which an organization is chartered—was deter-
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mined by examining the organization’s identity, and the identity of its parents when appropri-
ate, for cues about the type, as well as by verifying cues available through supplemental infor-
mation as above. In some cases, specialized databases (such as the airport information service
http://www.airnav.com/) were also employed. Categories of organization type include: govern-
ment (65.4%), collective (2.7%), not-for-profit (16.7%), and for-profit (13.6%). Type could not be
ascertained for 26 organizations (1.6% of the EMON); these were coded as missing.
3 The Katrina EMON
After tagging and coding, our data consists of a set of 187 networks, each consisting of the orga-
nizations and associated relationships reported in a specific source document, as well as secondary
information on the organizations involved. This information can be combined in a variety of ways
to study the global network of interorganizational collaboration that emerged during and after the
passage of Hurricane Katrina. Here, we explore several facets of the Katrina EMON data: the
distribution of reports among information sources; the growth and development of the EMON over
time; aggregate properties of the EMON structure; the emergence of certain organizations as central
actors in the collaboration network; and the presence of cohesive subgroups within the aggregate
structure.
3.1 Sources and Reporting
Table 2 displays basic descriptives for the portion of the Katrina EMON extracted from each of the
21 source organizations in this data set.3 Each network described in Table 2 consists of the organiza-
tions and collaborative relationships reported by a single source, aggregated over all SITREPs from
that source. As the table indicates, there is substantial variation in the number of organizations
mentioned by each source. Not surprisingly, those source organizations reporting on the largest
number of other organizations, such as the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (alema), the
Florida Department of Emergency Management (fldem), and the United States Office of Electric-
ity Delivery and Energy Reliability (usea), were all organizations whose geographic jurisdictions
were positioned along the storm track. Sources also showed substantial variation in the number of
ties reported among mentioned organizations. Despite this, the vast majority of sources did note
the existence of collaborative relationships: Palm Beach County, FL DEM (flpalmbe), Williamson
County, TN EMA (tnwillia), and the National Interagency Fire Center (usnifc) were the only source
organizations reporting no ties among mentioned organizations for the period studied here.
While many organizations are identified as active in the response, it is important to distinguish
between mobilization and collaboration. An organization may be mobilized in the sense that it is
actively involved in response activities (and thus present in the network), without those activities
requiring direct collaboration with other organizations. Indeed, as Table 2 indicates, 15 of the 21
source organizations (about 71%) provided reports in which 50% or more of the involved organiza-
tions were isolates. That is, informant accounts consistently suggest the collaborating organizations
are a minority of those active in the immediate post-impact period.
As we shall see, these “local” impressions continue to hold when individual source accounts
are aggregated to estimate the global network. It is also evident that the size of the largest
component within the activities reported on by each source varies greatly – some sources focus
on network activities within a single component, whereas others report activities spanning many
components. Table 3 displays the distribution of the types of organizations reported on by each
3See Appendix A for the full names of the source organizations.
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source organization. We will return to some of these issues in Section 4.1, when we consider their
implications for assessing the role of source organizations in the Katrina EMON.
3.2 Structural Evolution
As previously noted, an important dimension of the Hurricane Katrina EMON is its evolution
through time. The SITREPs from which these network data were extracted span the entire study
period, up to and including one week after landfall of Katrina in Louisiana, yielding thirteen daily
“snapshots” (8/24/05 through 9/05/05). Examining the state of the EMON at each of these time
points allows us to explore the evolution of social structure among the responding organizations.
Some basic properties of these temporal cross sections are shown in Figure 2 and Table 4. As both
clearly demonstrate, the data indicate substantial growth as time progresses.
Over time we see the emergence of a giant component within the network, joined by a large
number of isolates and small non-isolate components. This giant component grows from only two
organizations on 8/24/05 to 163 by 9/05/05 (reaching a maximum observed size of 219 organiza-
tions on 9/04/05). While the giant component grows over time, the number of smaller, non-isolate
components increases on average as well. Substantively, this implies not only the formation of one
central cluster of activity among the organizations in the Katrina response, but also the simulta-
neous proliferation of smaller clusters of organized activity. These smaller clusters often consist of
organizations involved in similar fields.
The growth of the network as a whole is also readily seen in Figure 2, with an average accu-
mulation of just under 60 organizations per day throughout the period (mean 58.8, SD 74.9). By
the end of the observation period, over 700 organizations are reported as active on any given day.
While this growth is accompanied by a small increase in mean degree, the increase is fairly modest
once the first day is omitted (p = 0.06, one-tailed permutation test of correlation). A point of even
greater stability is the fraction of isolates in the graph, a number whose decline is not significant
(p = 0.274) even when the first time point is included (p = 0.06). Although the EMON expands
by a factor of over 50 during the period of observation, the fraction of isolates within the structure
generally fluctuates around a mean of 67.34% (SD 0.07, dropping to 0.05 with the first day omitted).
Both of these factors suggest that while mass convergence to the scene is substantial, the propen-
sity to become involved in collaborative activities remains roughly constant as the disaster unfolds.
This, in turn, suggests the action of some equilibrating process, in which organizations balance the
immediate returns to so-called “freelancing” activities (response operations conducted in isolation)
with the costs and benefits of collaboration. For those that do collaborate, the coalescence of such
efforts into a giant component is not in and of itself surprising in light of what would be expected
from random mixing (Bolloba´s, 2001). Thus, a key feature of Katrina’s EMON evolution would
seem to be (at first blush) the selection of organizations into or out of collaborative relationships
per se, rather than simply the choice of with whom to collaborate.
3.3 Aggregate Network Structure
While the Katrina EMON can be considered intertemporally, it is also useful to examine the
aggregate patterns of collaboration that develop over the course of the entire observation period.
In addition to removing idiosyncratic variability due to the effects of day-to-day conditions, an
aggregate view of the EMON provides an effective summary of the response as a whole, and as
such may be more useful for detecting broader structural tendencies. Here, we highlight several
properties of the aggregate network structure, before turning to the identification of central actors
in the Katrina response network.
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Figure 3: Aggregate Katrina EMON; Vertices Colored by FEMA Region of Organizational Head-
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Figure 4: The 10 U.S. FEMA Regions, by State
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To form an aggregate structure, the daily EMON “snapshots” were aggregated across each day
using a union rule: that is, all vertices and edges reported in each day of data collection were
combined into an aggregate graph. The resulting aggregated EMON is both large and sparse,
with 1,577 vertices, 857 edges, 997 isolates, 26 non-isolate components, and a mean degree of
approximately 1.1 (density 0.001). The sociogram of the aggregated EMON is displayed in Figure 3.
To provide a geographical context for the aggregate network structure, the vertices of Figure 3
are colored by membership in the regional divisions used by FEMA to coordinate emergency re-
sponse activities within the United States. (Isolates are not shown, but counts within each region
are provided in the figure legend.) The ten FEMA regions are themselves depicted in Figure 4. For
purposes of analysis, we treat an organization as “belonging” to a FEMA region if its headquarters
resides within it; FEMA regions are institutionally significant focal points for both pre- and post-
event coordination within the emergency management community, and as such form a natural basis
on which to divide the vertex set. As expected, there is considerable propinquity in the Katrina
EMON both within and between FEMA regions. Of the edges in the aggregate network, 71.2% are
incident between nodes that are in the same FEMA region (p <1e-08, one-tailed Binomial test). A
test of differential homophily by region (not shown) confirms that these strong propinquity effects
are consistent across regions; interestingly, regions 4 and 6 (the two most directly affected by the
storm) show slightly lower rates of self-mixing than other FEMA regions. An ERGM analysis shows
that this difference does not persist when controls for regional average degree are added, suggesting
that the effect stems from a general suppression of collaboration rates among organizations sited
in the hardest hit areas, rather than from a reduction in propinquity per se.
In addition to the obvious propinquity in the aggregate EMON structure, Figure 3 suggests
substantial heterogeneity in collaboration rates across organizations. While the mean degree of the
aggregate EMON is approximately 1, the observed maximum of 45 (and mode of 0) confirms the
presence of a very right-skewed degree distribution. Inspection of the degree distribution histogram
reveals (Figure 5, solid dots) that the distribution is monotonic, but cannot effectively distinguish
among competing models. Following Jones and Handcock (2003), we employ likelihood-based model
selection criteria to assess the aggregate degree distribution. Poisson, geometric, negative binomial,
Yule, and Waring distributions were fit to the aggregate degree data using the degreenet package
of the statnet network analysis library (Handcock et al., 2003). Expected degree frequencies for
each fitted model are depicted via the colored lines in the left panel of Figure 5. Goodness of
fit information for these models is shown in Table 5; as the table indicates, the Waring and Yule
models are clearly favored by the data. Fits for the latter two models are essentially similar (see
also figure 5, right-hand panel), with the Bayesian information criterion favoring the Yule model
and the corrected Akaike’s criterion slightly favoring the Waring model—since the Yule is a special
case of the Waring model, this suggests that the degree distribution is effectively Yule-like in char-
acter. Such a result is interesting, given that the Yule/Waring distribution declines as a power law
in the upper tail. Here, the MLE for the scaling parameter (under the Waring parametrization)
is 3.09 ± 0.35 (asymptotic 95% CI), placing it almost exactly at the threshold of 3 required to
exhibit finite variance. Simon (1955) famously demonstrated the potential for such distributions
to arise via a frequency-biased sampling process, re-interpreted in the network context in terms of
a “cumulative advantage” (Price, 1976) or “preferential attachment” (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999)
mechanism. While many social structures (e.g., any with non-monotone degree distributions) can-
not be accounted for in this way, we observe that the aggregate degree distribution for the Katrina
EMON is not immediately incompatible with such a process. Alternately, distributions of this form
can also arise as a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity; see, e.g., Irwin (1963), Johnson et al.
(1992, chapter 6) for less context-specific discussion.
In addition to the degree distribution, we also examine a number of properties related to other
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Model df Log Likelihood AICC BIC
Poisson 1 -3470.83 6943.67 6949.03
Geometric 1 -2278.29 4558.59 4563.95
Negative Binomial 2 -2072.55 4149.1 4159.82
Yule 1 -2035.11 4072.22 4077.59
Waring 2 -2033.78 4071.56 4082.28
Table 5: Degree Distribution Model Fits, Aggregate EMON Data
Graph Level Index
Observed
GLI
Mean
Random
GLI
SD
Random
GLI
Pr(X ≤ Obs) Pr(X ≥ Obs)
Degree Centralization 0.028 0.003 0.000b 1.000a 0.000b
Eigenvector Centralization 0.364 0.482 0.056 0.036 0.964
Krackhardt Efficiency 0.995 0.983 0.01 0.983 0.017
Proportion Isolates 0.632 0.337 0.008 1.000a 0.000b
Transitivity 0.160 0.001 0.002 1.000a 0.000b
a x < 1e− 3; b x > 0.999
Table 6: Conditional Uniform Graph Test Results for Graph Level Indices
aspects of the EMON as a whole. Four graph level indices (GLIs) computed on the aggregate
EMON were compared to GLI distributions from 1,000 randomly generated density-conditioned
graphs to evaluate the extent to which the empirical network GLIs deviate from a baseline model of
random association (Mayhew, 1984), i.e. a conditional uniform graph test. The GLIs tested for this
purpose are degree centralization, eigenvector centralization, Krackhardt efficiency (Krackhardt,
1994), proportion of isolates, and transitivity, each of which summarizes some aspect of the global
structure of the Katrina EMON. The results of this analysis are given in Table 6.
As reported in Table 6, the Katrina EMON has observed values greater than the 97.5% quantile
of the baseline distributions in all cases other than eigenvector centralization. Degree centralization,
proportion isolates, and transitivity are all highly significant with GLI values that are approximately
53, 35, and 103 standard deviations above the mean of the baseline distributions, respectively.
Krackhardt efficiency is significantly high, despite being only 1.2 standard deviations above its
expectation.4 The eigenvector centralization of the Katrina EMON is also significantly lower than
expected at approximately 2.1 standard deviations below the mean of the baseline distribution
(although the p-value in this case indicates much less deviation).
Together, these results provide evidence that the sparseness of the network is non-uniformly dis-
tributed. In particular, compared to random graphs of the same density, edges within the aggregate
network are concentrated within a highly centralized giant component that—although sparse—does
have far more triangles than would occur naturally. Although this lowers the Krackhardt efficiency
somewhat, a small number of excess ties within a single large component (surrounded primarily by
isolates) has less impact on the efficiency score than would the same number of excess ties spread
among several much smaller components; thus, we observe an efficiency that is higher than that
expected under the baseline model. The unexpectedly low level of eigenvector centralization further
tells us that the excess edges in the giant component are not sufficiently concentrated to create the
degree of core-periphery structure that would otherwise arise from density alone. While degree is
quite inequitably distributed, therefore, we do not see strong evidence of a structurally dominant
4Note that its baseline distribution is highly non-Gaussian.
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clique of mutually collaborating organizations—instead, the giant component is substantially het-
erogeneous, with a richer collection of interacting subgroups than would obtain from chance alone.
As we will see in Section 3.5, this phenomenon arises from the presence in several sets of inten-
sively collaborating organizations linked to one another by a combination of interdependencies and
existing institutional relationships.
3.4 Central Organizations
As we have seen, the Katrina EMON is highly centralized with respect to degree, with most or-
ganizations acting alone and a small number participating in extensive collaboration. Likewise,
the apparent concentration of triangles within an irregular inner core (a matter to which we re-
turn below) suggests that some organizations will be much better positioned to act in bridging
roles than others. This invites the question of which organizations occupy the high-centrality po-
sitions within the aggregate network. Such organizations are expected to play key roles in the
response process—with accompanying unique challenges. High degree organizations, for instance,
are “mass collaborators.” Since collaborating with a new partner always entails coordination costs
(Williamson, 1975), such mass collaborators are expected to face substantial pressure to systematize
their interactions with other organizations. If effective, adaptations undertaken for this purpose
may spread to partnering organizations, and thence to other portions of the network.
Unlike mass collaborators, high betweenness organizations may not have many partners; how-
ever, they must bridge portions of the collaboration network that are not otherwise well-connected.
Given the limited communication infrastructure available in the aftermath of the storm (Lind et al.,
2008), direct collaboration can be expected to have played a more significant role in propagating
information and resources during the Katrina response than would be expected under normal con-
ditions. While not all communication was restricted to collaborative relationships—and not all
paths within the aggregate EMON would have been communication permeable (e.g., due to or-
dering effects, communication failure, etc.)—we may regard the aggregate network structure as at
least a crude indicator of those pairs of organizations having the greatest opportunity for infor-
mation and resource exchange during the early days of the response. To the extent that this is
the case, organizations with high betweenness in the aggregate network are particularly likely to
have been in a position to maintain contact between groups of organizations not otherwise able to
share information or resources. Under the same assumptions, we may expect high-closeness orga-
nizations to end up obtaining novel information more quickly than their peers. This may, in turn,
prompt such organizations to assume the role of “clearinghouses,” a role that is also facilitated by
their structural positions. Thus, different dimensions of centrality in the network of interorganiza-
tional collaboration are expected to correlate with differing challenges and opportunities, leading
to distinct patterns of behavior.
Turning to the data, we begin our analysis with degree, followed by betweenness and closeness
centrality (Freeman, 1979). The degrees of the responding organizations range from 0 to 45, with
the mean at 1.1 and the median at 0. As we have seen (and as Figure 6 illustrates), a small number
of organizations collaborate with far more partners than is typical for the network as a whole. An
enumeration of the ten highest-degree actors is given in Table 7 (see also Figure 6).
Considering Table 7, we observe that organizations having considerable prior experience with
disasters and/or with advanced disaster preparedness measures and infrastructure in place tend to
dominate the list of high-degree actors. That the American Red Cross maintains high numbers of
collaborations aligns well with both the organization’s institutional status as an officially recognized
coordinator of relief activities and its substantial infrastructure for supporting such coordination.
High levels of disaster recovery experience, funding, and support are reasonable indicators that
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Organization Name Degree
Colorado Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 45
American Red Cross 41
Texas State Operations Center 36
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 30
Emergency Management Assistance Compact 27
Georgia State Operations Center 27
Dry Tortugas/Everglades National Park 26
Florida SERT, Emergency Support Service Branch 25
Alabama EMA, Emergency Operations Center, ESF 9 23
Missouri Emergency Management Agency (EMA) 23
Table 7: Ten Highest Degree Central Organizations
Figure 6: Aggregate Katrina EMON, Vertices Scaled by Degree
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Organization Name Betweenness
American Red Cross 63,200.01
Emergency Management Assistance Compact 37,368.09
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 29,653.28
Texas State Operations Center 25,210.5
Colorado Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 21,045.11
Texas Forest Service 17,823
Dry Tortugas/Everglades National Park 17,581.5
U.S. Forest Service, Atlanta, GA 17,404
Humane Society of the US 15,923.23
Georgia State Operations Center 13,555.81
Table 8: Ten Highest Betweenness Central Organizations
an organization involved in a disaster scenario will be well equipped to maintain many direct ties
to other organizations, out of both circumstance and necessity. Such factors may play a role
in explaining the prominence of “outside” entities such as the Colorado Division of Emergency
Management, which occupies the highest rank on degree in the Katrina network. Despite being
far from the path of the storm, the Colorado DEM maintained more direct contacts with other
agencies than any other agency mentioned in any of the SITREPs. While many of these contacts
were to non-Colorado entities, a major factor in the centrality of the Colorado DEM was its role
in coordinating with other units dispatched from the state to the disaster site. For instance,
a September 5, 2005 press release by then governor of Colorado Bill Owens notes that among
the responders sent to the stricken area was a team from the Colorado DEM experienced in post-
hurricane relief. In addition, almost 700 members of Colorado’s National Guard were sent to various
damaged areas (Owens, 2005). Although organizationally distinct, these closely related entities (in
the sense of the organizational lineage structure) tended to mobilize together, and were especially
likely to collaborate with one another. While counter-intuitive, the presence of numerous, highly
active outside organizations is in line with previous research on the mass convergence of individuals
and organizations during disasters (Fritz and Mathewson, 1957; Mileti et al., 1975; Auf der Heide,
1989; Drabek and McEntire, 2002; Drabek, 2003). We also note the representation of emergency
management agencies from Florida and Georgia, which are located in regions for which hurricanes
are a recurrent hazard, as significant players in the network. For such organizations, proximity
to the storm track, experience in the domain, and institutionalized connections (e.g., mutual aid
agreements) may all have played a role in encouraging extensive collaboration in the immediate
post-impact period.
While degree is useful for identifying organizations with extensive collaborative activity, be-
tweenness is a better indicator of the extent to which an organization collaborates with partners
not otherwise closely linked to one another. In the Katrina EMON, the organizations highest in
betweenness are indicated in Table 8. Degree and betweenness are typically correlated, and many of
the same organizations that rank highest in degree also rank highly in betweenness centrality. The
American Red Cross (ARC) plays the largest bridging role in the Katrina EMON, collaborating
with a wide range of organizations from many different communities. Such behavior is consonant
with the unique statutory role of the Red Cross under the then-active National Response Plan
(DHS, 2004), which mandates that it serve as a primary bridge between voluntary organizations,
providers of medical services and relief supplies, federal agencies, and the general public. With a
betweenness score nearly twice that of the next-highest scoring organization (and more than twice
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Organization Name Closeness
American Red Cross 0.35
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 0.32
Emergency Management Assistance Compact 0.32
Salvation Army 0.31
Missouri Emergency Management Agency (EMA) 0.3
Colorado Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 0.29
Georgia State Operations Center 0.29
Texas State Operations Center 0.29
Virginia State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 0.28
Texas Governor’s Division of Emergency Management (DEM) 0.28
Table 9: Ten Highest Closeness Central Organizations
that of FEMA), we can see that the ARC did indeed occupy a uniquely prominent bridging role
during the first days of the unfolding disaster.
As with degree, it is interesting to note that many of these “bridging” organizations were head-
quartered in areas that allowed them to continue to function without worry of destruction from
the hurricane. By being sited away from the center of damage, many of these organizations were
able to continue conducting business from their headquarters location and maintain communication
with others. As such, this may have increased the chances that they would serve as conduits for
information and resource exchange among others in the network.
Finally, closeness centrality has been used to assess the extent to which a given network position
is generally proximate to others in a social network. To be the “closest” actor in a social network
is to have the shortest paths to all other actors in the network compared to all other actors.
A definitional constraint on closeness centrality is that an actor’s distance from (or closeness to)
another actor for which there is no path is poorly defined (and generally treated as infinite). That is,
the distance between actors in a network that have no paths between them is undefined; this has the
net effect of reducing closeness for all actors involved to zero, making the measure effectively useless
on disconnected graphs (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Because the aggregated Katrina EMON is
not fully connected, we cannot usefully apply closeness to the graph as a whole. Instead, we limit
ourselves to considering the relative closeness of vertices within the graph’s giant component. As
such, the closeness measure used here was computed for the 497 members of the main component
in the network, out of 1,577 total vertices in the graph. The ten organizations with the highest
value of closeness within the giant component are listed in Table 9.
Once again, many of the same organizations reappear as central players: the American Red
Cross, FEMA, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the Colorado DEM, the Georgia
State Operations Center, and the Texas State Operations Center. The organizations highest on this
measure have the theoretical potential to pass communications and/or resources to other organiza-
tions by traversing the smallest number of steps in the network. That is, if we take the aggregate
EMON as a rough proxy for the capacity to send information or resources during the study period,
these organizations could pass such material to other organizations in the main component with
said having to pass through fewer hands (on average) than low-closeness organizations. Although
this does not in and of itself guarantee that organizations in these positions did engage in this
efficient behavior, they are more likely to have had the opportunity to do so than equivalent orga-
nizations in low-closeness positions. As such, knowledge of which organizations are likely to have
high closeness may allow organizations like those listed here to plan for more effective use of their
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structural positions in EMONs arising from future disasters. While the organizations highest in
betweenness have the greatest ability to bridge and filter connections among others, those highest
in closeness centrality have the potential to disseminate key information to others in the network in
the shortest amount of time (and with minimal distortion). Given the vital role of improvisation in
disaster response (Wachtendorf, 2004), the capacity for such organizations to serve as low-latency
coordinators may be of particular importance.
3.5 Cores and Cohesion
In Section 3.3, we noted a seeming paradox: despite the sparseness and apparently tree-like structure
of the Katrina EMON, it in fact contains a surplus of triangles. To understand how this can be so
– and to get a sense of what may explain the phenomenon – we close this section with a look at
cohesion in the aggregate network.
A useful method of revealing cohesive substructure in a large graph is the examination of its
cores (Seidman, 1983). A (degree) k-core of graph G is a maximal set of vertices such that all
members of the set are adjacent to at least k other members. Although cores are not necessarily
cohesive (or even connected), higher-order cores (i.e., those with k > 1) are necessarily unions of sets
that are at least biconnected. Thus, all members of a high-order core belong to robustly connected
subgroups, although those subgroups may or may not be connected to each other. Because k-cores
can be used to identify sets of cohesive subgroups, and because k-cores are easily computed even
for large networks, they are of considerable utility for exploratory analysis of networks such as the
aggregate Katrina EMON.
An initial visualization of the Katrina EMON showing core membership is shown in the top
left panel of Figure 7. This figure depicts the 1-core, or the network formed by all vertices having
at least one tie to some other vertex in the core; eliminated by this selection are the isolates, who
belong only to the 0-core. It should be noted that another useful feature of the core structure is
its hierarchical decomposibility: since any member of the kth core is necessarily a member of every
lower order core, the cores form a nested structure of increasing local cohesion on the underlying
graph. Let the kth shell of graph G be the set of vertices belonging to G’s k-core, but not to the
corresponding k + 1-core. Then the 0-shell consists of the isolates, the 1-shell consists of vertices
belonging to trees or pendant trees, the 2-shell consists of vertices belonging to 2-connected sets,
etc. Labeling each vertex by its shell membership thus allows us to identify regions of higher
local cohesion within the broader network. This is shown in Figure 7 via vertex coloring, with
shell numbers indicated by the legend in the lower-right corner of each panel. Examining the 1-
core structure (top left), we can immediately see that the numerically dominant 1-shell conceals
a smaller (but still substantial) collection of cohesively connected organizations. Cohesion is thus
present within the network, but it is clearly localized among a sub-population of organizations.
Focusing only on those vertices belonging to sets that are at least biconnected (the 2-core) leaves
us with the structure shown in the top right panel of Figure 7. While much smaller than the EMON
as a whole, this portion of the network still contains 241 organizations (approximately 15%). As can
be appreciated from Figure 7, the 2-core is itself quite inhomogeneous, consisting of a combination
of loosely connected cohesive units, independent cohesive groups, and tree-like structures centered
on small numbers of nodes having shared relations to numerous non-adjacent alters. Stripping away
those organizations existing only within the 2-shell (Figure 7, bottom left panel) reveals that just
under half of the organizations belonging to the 2-core (106, or 44%) are embedded in local groups
with an even higher level of cohesion. Like the 2-core, the 3-core is substantially inhomogeneous,
being composed of several distinct clusters linked by a complex of organizations with extensive
cross-cutting ties. Removing the 3-shell (Figure 7, bottom right panel) eliminates most of these
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Figure 7: Aggregate Katrina EMON, 1, 2, 3, and 4-Cores; Vertices Colored by k-shell Membership
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boundary spanners, revealing a “hard core” of five highly cohesive clusters. It is worth noting,
however, that even these clusters are connected to one another by a small number of boundary
spanners, and indeed the two most cohesive subgroups within the network are directly tied to one
another. The Katrina EMON as a whole, then, can be thought of as a loosely connected set of
highly cohesive clusters, surrounded by an extensive “halo” of pendant trees, small independent
components, and isolates.
If the inner structure of the Katrina EMON is built around a relatively small set of cohesive
subgroups, it is natural to ask whether these groups appear to reflect the action of institutional or
task-related factors, versus idiosyncratic (and thus effectively random) effects. While randomness
can never be definitively dismissed, examination of the organizations involved strongly suggests the
former explanation. Figure 8 depicts the Katrina 3-core, with vertices colored by affiliation and type.
As can be seen, the clusters comprising the 3-core are divided almost perfectly along institutional
lines, with immediately identifiable clusters corresponding to Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
and Virginia state and local governmental organizations, U.S. federal organizations, and NGOs
involved in humanitarian response. Even within these divisions, we find task-related homogeneity:
for instance, the larger portion of the humanitarian cluster is dominated by organizations related to
animal welfare, veterinary medicine, and animal rescue/relocation, while its smaller, independent
component consists of various volunteer organization (VOAD) collectives. Likewise, much of the
federal cluster consists of organizations involved in energy policy and infrastructure (a sector that
was heavily mobilized due to the impact of the disaster on nationally significant oil resources), the
Alabama cluster is dominated by operations and rescue teams, etc. Thus, where intensive, cohesive
collaboration structures developed, they tended to form at the intersection of common institutions
and common task domains.
While the higher-order cores of the Katrina EMON are dominated by institutionally homoge-
neous clusters, it is also noteworthy that these clusters are held together by a congeries of orga-
nizations that are often distinct from the clusters they connect. Some of these organizations are
highlighted in Figure 8; among them are major national players such as the American Red Cross
and FEMA, as well as important regional or case-specific actors such as the Colorado DEM and
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. In some cases, the key boundary spanners are
clearly task-related. For instance, the U.S. Department of Agriculture emerges as an important
organization connecting the animal welfare subgroup, FEMA, and the Colorado DEM – although
not stereotypically thought of as a major player in emergency response, the Department’s unique
mix of resources, jurisdiction, and contacts make it a natural bridge between federal, state, and
non-governmental organizations working to manage the disruption to livestock and other animal
populations resulting from disasters that impact rural areas. In other cases, boundary spanning
organizations are clearly institutionalized coordinators (in the sense of Petrescu-Prahova and Butts,
2008) such as FEMA or state emergency management departments, whose formal roles involve co-
ordinating the actions of other organizations during emergencies. Analogously to what has been
found in studies at the individual level (Butts et al., 2007; Petrescu-Prahova and Butts, 2008),
coordination roles in inner core of the Katrina EMON appear to be filled by a combination of
organizations with a standing mandate to bridge diverse groups and organizations whose centrality
emerges from task and resource considerations that are peculiar to the specific event. Although
the latter may be case specific, it should be noted that they are neither arbitrary nor entirely
unpredictable; indeed, a major goal of recent U.S. government planning activities in the wake of
disasters such as Katrina has been to identify the types of disruptions that are likely to arise from
various kinds of hazards, and to prepare organizations operating in the associated domains for the
possibility that they may be thrust into a coordinative role when disaster strikes.
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Figure 8: Aggregate Katrina EMON, Detail of 3-Core Structure
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4 Discussion
Drawing historical network information from documentary sources raises a number of methodolog-
ical challenges. Here, we briefly consider some of these issues, both with respect to the present data
set and to the practice of data collection in future EMON studies.
4.1 The Role of Source Organizations
Much—if not most—social network data arises from what can be called“own tie” self-report designs
of one form or another. While many such designs exist (see Marsden (2005) for a discussion), all have
in common the property that sampled entities provide information solely on their own relationships.
Families such as the complete ego-net and cognitive social structure (CSS) designs (Krackhardt,
1987), on the other hand, provide the possibility of using sampled entities as informants to reveal
edges among third parties. (See Butts (2003) for a review.) The approach pursued here lies in
some sense between pure own-tie reporting (in which only the informant’s ties are elicited) and
a full CSS design (in which every informant is queried regarding every tie). Source organizations
are assumed to report their own activities, but generally report on those of other organizations
as well—unlike a CSS, however, sources may omit third parties that are judged not salient for
their current operations, and/or of which they are unaware. Thus, we would expect to have the
greatest information on ties among source organizations, and from source organizations to others
in the network; ties among non-source organizations are less certain. With this in mind, it is useful
to consider separately the role played by source organizations in the Katrina EMON itself, and
to ascertain the extent to which information reported by these organizations provides substantial
coverage of events beyond themselves. While we cannot rule out more subtle biases, the results of
our simple heuristic checks on the sources clearly show that our data collection design yielded an
aggregated network that is not reducible to the contents of each source organization’s ego net.
In addition to reporting on the response effort and on ties between other organizations, the
source organizations (many of which were highly placed emergency management agencies) were
also important actors in their own right. Because they tended to play especially active roles within
the Katrina response, source organizations would be expected to have higher degrees in the Katrina
EMON: organizations issuing SITREPs are generally larger than other organizations, with more
resources and more institutional responsibility for coordinative activity. However, a strong rela-
tionship between high degree and status as a source organization—for instance, if all high degree
organizations were source organizations and/or all sources were high degree organizations—could
imply that activities of other high-degree organizations were not effectively captured. As a heuristic
check on the extent of source organization degree bias, then, we compare the marginals of source
organization degrees to those of all organizations in the Katrina EMON.
As expected, source organizations do tend to have higher degrees (source organizations have
a mean degree of 7.76 versus 1 for non-sources). However, source organizations do not dominate
the upper tail of the degree distribution (of the top 20 organizations, only 5 are sources), and 43%
of sources have degree less than or equal to the global mean (i.e., 1 or 0). This suggests that the
degree distribution is not simply an artifact of source organizations reporting only on their own
activities. On the contrary, the observed distribution is consistent with what would be expected
(prima facie, at least) given the nature of the organizations involved.
An even more direct test of this notion is provided by considering the extent to which source
organizations report on organizations and/or relationships with which they are not involved. On
average, source organizations report on approximately 82 other organizations with which they have
no collaborative relationship, and approximately 34 third-party edges. Of the latter, an average of
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Figure 9: Bipartite Graph of Katrina EMON Source and Non-Source Organizations; Edges Indicate
Organizations Reported On, by Source
22 are ties among third parties that are both non-adjacent to the source (i.e., that are beyond the
source’s second order neighborhood). Sources typically report on a far larger set of organizations
than are in their own neighborhoods, and describe many more collaborative relationships than
those involving themselves (with many relationships reported among organizations that themselves
have no direct connection to the source). While sources may indeed be more aware of activities
undertaken by themselves or by their collaborators, the conjecture that source reports are simply
a reflection of those activities can clearly be rejected.
Another factor to consider is the overlap in source reports. While it would be expected that
certain source organizations would report on particular types of ties (e.g. the Humane Society of
the United States reporting on American Veterinary Medical Association VMAT’s tie to itself), we
would expect that some organizations should also be reported on by multiple sources. Figure 9 is a
bipartite (two-mode) graph of the 21 sources by the 1,577 organizations in the EMON. This graph is
constructed from reporting relationships rather than collaboration, such that ties represent source
organizations (yellow) reporting on non-source organizations (blue). Loops on yellow vertices indi-
cate that a source organization reported on collaboration between itself and another organization.
Many subgraphs within this network have a “mushroom” shape, indicating that many organizations
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are mentioned by only one source. On the other hand, we also see many blue nodes with multiple
edges, showing that a number of organizations are mentioned in several source accounts.
While this source overlap is limited, it is non-trivial. Among vertices having at least one
edge in the EMON, 11.55% are named by more than one source, while 11.33% of isolates in the
EMON are named by more than one source. In all, 180 organizations receive multiple reports.
Organizations in this latter category do not have significantly more ties than those reported by a
single source (p =0.8714), suggesting that EMON degree is not an artifact of visibility. Of the source
organizations themselves, five were mentioned by other source organizations: fdem, gagmag, miema,
humane, and usnifc. The majority are thus mentioned only once (and, indeed, this frequency does
not differ significantly from that for the rest of the organizational population, p =0.2092).
In sum, it is clear that our data lies between the extremes of CSS designs (in which all sources
report on all ties) and own-tie designs (in which sources report only on their own interactions). Each
source reports on a wide range of activities beyond its own ego net, and the resulting aggregate is not
simply a reflection of the source organizations’ activities. On the other hand, most organizations
are uniquely reported, a feature that seems to be unrelated to the collaborative activity of the
organization in question.
4.2 SITREPs Versus Media Accounts
It is worth comparing the type of source utilized here with the other major archival source employed
in disaster EMON research, namely media (particularly newspaper) coverage. Media sources act as
“information integrators”during disasters, providing accounts that synthesize inputs from a number
of informants (Auf der Heide, 1989). These accounts are frequently updated during major events,
and are readily available to researchers; such features make them very attractive as materials
from which to extract EMON data. By comparison, SITREPs are relatively difficult to obtain,
and may or may not be updated with similar frequency (depending on the issuing organization).
On the other hand, SITREPs also hold certain advantages over media accounts. As documents
prepared for internal use by the responders themselves, SITREPs are prima facie more consistent
with the state of organizational knowledge than statements issued to the press (which may be
abbreviated or manipulated for reasons of liability, intelligibility to a non-technical audience, or
adherence to a preferred frame (Tierney et al., 2006)). Similarly, SITREPs are typically focused
on events that are directly related to task performance, whether or not these events are believed
to be of interest to the public at large; by contrast, media organizations are strongly motivated
to concentrate coverage on events with immediate public impact. As such, information provided
in SITREPs may provide a better basis for reconstruction of task performance, especially where
such performance does not directly involve lifesaving or other easily explicable components. This
distinction is further exaggerated by the fact that SITREP authors are usually working in the field
(or are in direct contact with those working in the field), a circumstance that may or may not
be true of those who write media accounts. While some reporters will be deployed to the impact
site, others will be reliant on second- or third-hand information (possibly from the responding
organizations themselves). Since the primary audience for these accounts is also removed from the
response process itself, incentives to convey accurate and detailed information regarding specific
organizational actions (or the spatial and relational context of those actions) may be weak. As
SITREP readership is heavily concentrated among those who are both present and actively working
in the field, incentives for accuracy are substantially increased.
While media accounts have many weaknesses as sources for EMON research, we do not wish to
suggest that they are without merit. Media organizations with an extensive contact network may
be very effective at collecting information on local conditions, especially where public demands for
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detailed information are strong. The differing audiences for which media organizations produce
accounts may lead them to avoid “blind spots” to which SITREP authors may be prone (e.g.,
the activities of small, private sector organizations). Since media organizations are specifically
designed for information gathering, transmission, and dissemination, they may be able to effectively
maintain situational awareness even under adverse conditions. Indeed, emergency management
organizations themselves often turn to media sources for information on current conditions outside
their immediate zone of operations (Auf der Heide, 1989), suggesting that the flow of information is
more bidirectional than might be anticipated. Despite our reservations about the quality of media
reports, therefore, we do not recommend that they be abandoned as a source in EMON research.
Rather, we suggest that they be employed where available, ideally using a framework that integrates
the different properties of these sources. The informant accuracy paradigm used by Butts et al.
(2007) to combine personal accounts of responder interactions in the World Trade Center disaster
may constitute a possible approach to this problem.
4.3 Implications for Automated Information Extraction
Given the substantial human investment required in extracting network information from documen-
tary accounts (as described in Section 2), the potential gains from the use of automated information
extraction in cases like that studied here are profound. As documents such as SITREPs are rela-
tively stylized in form, and since many of the locations and organizations mentioned within them
belong to a known population, the present case might seem to be a good target for the use of
automated text analysis. While we see great long-range potential in such efforts, our experiences
have highlighted a number of challenges to automated coding of organizational network information
from SITREPs or similar documents. We mention a few of these here, as a resource for researchers
who may be interested in pursuing this approach.
One consideration that should be borne in mind when working with SITREPs (and other field
documents) is that they are texts produced by human writers for use by human readers occupying
the same context, within a narrow time window. Time pressure and human failings naturally lead
to minor errors and variability; since the intended readers are expected to intelligently use shared
context and background information when interpreting the account, there is little incentive for
writers to purge these features from their texts. As a result, SITREPs often contain spelling errors,
typos, and other forms of human error. For example, “St. Paul’s Episcopal Church” was rendered
in one document as “St. Pauls Apiscaple Church.” This required correction by a human coder, who
had to 1) note the likely misspelling, and 2) verify through other means that there was no“Apiscaple
Church” in the area. Organization and place name consistency was another problem that required
a human coder to use context to determine the appropriate representation of entities within the
EMON. For instance, the U.S. Federal Government might be referred to as the “U.S. Government”
or “Federal Government,” and New Orleans, LA might be referred to as “The City of New Orleans,”
“New Orleans,” or “NOLA.” Such nomenclature is often transparent to a human coder, but is not
trivial for purposes of automated recognition (requiring, for instance, the labor-intensive creation
of a specialized thesaurus for use with the corpus). More difficult yet are cases involving the use of
pronouns or other indirect references to organizations in the text (or contextual references to the
issuing organization, as in “our units are being dispatched”). While clear to a human reader, these
references can be very difficult for automated systems to identify and disambiguate.
Finally, we note that fairly minor differences in document formatting and layout may pose
problems for some text analysis systems. For instance, some documents in our corpus are written
entirely in capital letters, making it impossible to use heuristics based on capitalization (e.g., for
recognition of proper nouns). The use of headings and bullet lists also appears innocent at first
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blush, but may pose problems for tools that assume prose text with standardized sentence structure
(e.g., for part-of-speech recognition). On an even more prosaic note, “noise” characters created by
conversion of documents from one form to another (or present in the original documents for similar
reasons) may interfere with analysis routines as well. Documents can, of course, be cleaned and
standardized to remove these obstacles, but this is in and of itself a labor intensive process.
Given these factors, our assessment is that fully automated extraction of detailed network in-
formation from reports such as those used here will prove extremely challenging. Tools for this
purpose must be able to handle inconsistencies in text style and layout; minor errors in spelling,
punctuation, and grammar; use of colloquial and/or stylized entity references; use of pronouns and
other forms of indirect reference; and a certain amount of textual “noise.” Given the tremendous
volume of documentary evidence available on disasters and other, similar events, automated meth-
ods for document coding could prove revolutionary if practical. If our experience is any guide,
however, the way will be difficult.
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the use of archival research methods to reconstruct the dynamic
network of interorganizational collaboration that emerged after a major disaster. As such, it adds
to the small but growing set of disasters for which EMON data is available. Given the growing
vulnerability of human populations to natural hazards worldwide (de Sherbinin et al., 2007), an
understanding of the manner in which organizations mobilize and coordinate their response ac-
tivities is of vital practical importance. Likewise, the study of cases such as Hurricane Katrina
provides us with an important scientific window into the formation of structure within a disrupted
social system—in some respects, a macro-social version of Harold Garfinkel’s famous breaching
experiments (Garfinkel, 1967). By measuring and analyzing collaboration in the aftermath of the
Hurricane Katrina disaster, we hope to advance knowledge on both fronts.
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Appendix A: Source Organizations
Table 10 maps the abbreviated names of all 21 source organizations to their respective full names
for the data analyzed within this paper.
Appendix B: Katrina EMON Data Set
The data set described in this paper has been included with this publication as a library for the
R statistical computing system. This library contains the source data and codebook, as well as
additional documentation regarding the data coding and preparation process. In the event that the
library data file cannot be retrieved from the journal web page, it may also be obtained by request
from the corresponding author.
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